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Evidence
by Marc T. Treadwell*
I.

INTRODUCTION

The publication of this, article marks the tenth time the Mercer Law
Review has honored the author by asking him to survey Eleventh Circuit
evidence decisions. While some may argue the Review has returned to
the same well entirely too many times, ten years of analyzing Eleventh
Circuit evidence decisions cannot help but to give some perspective and,
perhaps, even some insight into the court's decisions. In this regard,
there can be no doubt that the Eleventh Circuit has dramatically
reduced its level of scrutiny of evidentiary issues. In the late 1980s, it
could be fairly said that the court often paid only lip service to the
principle that district court evidentiary decisions could be reversed only
for abuse of discretion. Thus, in early survey issues, we see the
Eleventh Circuit minutely reviewing evidence to determine whether the
district court ran afoul of Rule 403 which prohibits the admission of
evidence if its prejudicial impact outweighs its probative value.
Although, as discussed below, the Eleventh Circuit continues to apply
the Rule 403 balancing test as a part of the test for admissibility of
extrinsic act evidence under Rule 404(b), it is virtually unheard of for
the court to spend any time discussing Rule 403 alone. Rule 404(b),
which has probably received more attention from the Eleventh Circuit
than any other single rule of evidence, has become a much less
significant factor in appeals. Similarly, the admissibility of co-conspirators' statements under Rule 801(d)(2)(E) is now a routine matter rather
than a fecund ground for reversal.
One can debate endlessly the reason for this trend. No doubt, some
say that it is a consequence of the appointment of more conservative
judges. However, the existence of the trend is unmistakable. In today's
* Partner at the firm of Chambless, Higdon & Carson, Macon, Georgia. Valdosta State
University (B.A., 1978); Walter F. George School of Law (J.D., cum laude, 1981). Member,
State Bar of Georgia.
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environment, the Eleventh Circuit clearly defers much more broadly to
the evidentiary decisions of district court judges.
II. ARTICLE IV: RELEVANCY AND ITS LIMITS
The drafters of the Federal Rules of Evidence deserve high praise for
the twelve rules governing relevant evidence. These twelve, generally
brief, rules provide a cogent distillation of common law principles of
relevancy and a straightforward guide to practitioners. Article IV begins
with the simple statement that "'relevant evidence' means evidence
having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of
consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less
probable than it would be without the evidence."' In years past, most
relevancy issues addressed by the Eleventh Circuit have involved Rule
404(b), which governs the admission of extrinsic act evidence. Because
district courts are vested with broad discretion in evidentiary matters,
the Eleventh Circuit rarely discusses, much less reverses, the admission
or exclusion of evidence on general relevancy grounds. The Eleventh
Circuit's decision in United States v. Williams2 provides a good
illustration of proper general relevancy analysis. In Williams, defendant, who was charged with attempted carjacking, complained that the
district court improperly admitted testimony that an individual whom
he shot, but did not kill, was residing "in the cemetery" at the time of
the trial.' In criminal trials, the Eleventh Circuit noted, the scope of
relevancy is generally determined by the elements of the offense and the
defendant's defenses.4 Even if evidence is relevant, it may be excluded
if "its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by
consideration of undue delay, wasted time, or needless presentation of
cumulative evidence."5 In determining the relevancy of evidence,
district courts are granted broad discretion and should be affirmed "even
though we would have gone the other way had it been our call."6
Williams was such a case. Had it been the district court, the Eleventh
Circuit noted, it would have excluded evidence that the victim had died
because his subsequent death was not relevant to the elements of the
offense. Nevertheless, it could be said that the testimony was relevant,

1.

FED. R. EvD. 401.

2. 51 F.3d 1004 (11th Cir. 1995).
3. Id. at 1010.

4. Id. (quoting United States v. Hall, 653 F.2d 1002, 1005 (th Cir. Unit A Aug. 1981)).
5.
6.

FED, R. EviD. 403.
51 F.3d at 1010 (quoting In re Rasbury, 24 F.3d 159, 168 (11th Cir. 1994)).
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"although perhaps not by a wide margin. " ' For example, the district
court could have concluded that the evidence was relevant to explain the
witness's absence at trial.'
Rule 404 is the principal rule of evidence addressing the admissibility
of "extrinsic act evidence"-evidence of acts and transactions other than
the one at issue.' The rule is intended to prevent the introduction of
what has been called propensity evidence or evidence of prior misconduct
offered solely to prove that a defendant is of bad character and thus is
more likely to have committed the charged offense. Although nothing in
the terms of Rule 404(b) limits its application to criminal cases, courts
rarely mention Rule 404 in civil cases. Indeed, the level of scrutiny of
extrinsic act evidence seems much lower in criminal cases than in civil
cases. At first glance, this appears to be somewhat of an anomaly. In
criminal cases, where life and freedom are at stake, courts routinely
admit evidence of a defendant's prior misconduct. Yet in civil cases,
evidence of extrinsic occurrences is generally not admissible. For
example, in an automobile negligence case, it is highly unlikely that a
plaintiff could introduce evidence that a defendant had been involved in
prior motor vehicle collisions. There is, however, a rational basis for this
disparity of treatment.
Criminal prosecutions generally involve
intentional misconduct. The fact that a defendant committed a prior
similar offense is relevant to prove his intent to commit the charged
offense. Typically, civil cases do not involve intentional misconduct. In
the automobile negligence case, evidence that a defendant was involved
in a prior collision would merely serve to prove that the defendant,
because he was negligent on one occasion, is more likely to have been
negligent on the occasion at issue. This is precisely the result Rule 404
seeks to avoid.
To determine the admissibility of extrinsic act evidence under Rule
404, the Eleventh Circuit uses the test established by the old Fifth
Circuit in United States v. Beechurn.10 First, the extrinsic act evidence

7. Id. (quoting In re Rasbury, 24 F.3d at 168-69).
8. In United States v. Puentes, 50 F.3d 1567 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 341
(1995), another general relevancy decision, the Eleventh Circuit held that the district court
abused its discretion when it admitted irrelevant evidence, but found that the error was
harmless. 50 F.3d at 1577-78.

9. Rule 404 governs the admissibility of extrinsic act evidence offered for substantive
purposes. If the extrinsic act evidence is offered to impeach or bolster a witness, then the
admissibility of the evidence is determined by the rules found in Article VI, principally
Rule 608, which addresses the use of character evidence and evidence of specific instances
of conduct.
10.

582 F.2d 898 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 920 (1979).
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must be relevant to an issue other than the defendant's character.11
Second, the prosecution must prove that the defendant committed the
extrinsic act. 2 Third, the evidence must not contravene Rule 403."3
Consistent with its recent generally more relaxed scrutiny of district
court evidentiary decisions, the Eleventh Circuit, in stark contrast to its
prior practice, generally deferred to the district courts' extrinsic act
evidence decisions during the survey period. 4
5 is an
The Eleventh Circuit's decision in United States v. Delgado"
excellent primer on Rule 404(b) analysis. In Delgado, defendant
contended the district court improperly admitted, during his drug
trafficking trial, evidence of his arrest and conviction on cocaine
possession charges that were unrelated to the drug trafficking charges
and which occurred after the drug trafficking charges. 6 The Eleventh
Circuit first noted that it made no difference that the extrinsic act
occurred after the charged offense; the admissibility of the extrinsic act
evidence is still determined by the Beechum test. 7 The government
contended the extrinsic act was relevant to the issue of defendant's
intent to commit the charged offense and, thus, was relevant to an issue
other than defendant's character.' The Eleventh Circuit agreed that
by pleading not guilty, defendant made intent an issue, and the extrinsic
act was relevant to prove defendant's intent to commit the charged
offense because the state of mind involved in both offenses is the
same.' 9 The government easily satisfied the second element of the
Beechum test-defendant had been convicted of the extrinsic offense. 20
Defendant next argued that the probative value of the evidence was
outweighed by its prejudice because the two offenses were not similar
and, thus, the third prong of Beechum had not been met. 21 The
extrinsic offense involved a small purchase of drugs from an undercover

11. 582 F.2d at 911.
12. Id. at 903.

13. Id. at 911.
14. In the case of extrinsic act evidence, this deferential trend can be traced, at least
in part, to a definite cause. In Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681 (1988), the
Supreme Court held that the government did not have to prove that a defendant committed
the extrinsic act by clear and convincing evidence; it was sufficient that the government
proved the point by a preponderance of the evidence.
15. 56 F.3d 1357 (11th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom., Hernandez v. United States, 116
S. Ct. 404 (1995).

16. 56 F.3d at 1365.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.

20, Id. at 1366.
21. Id.
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agent while the charged offense involved a multi-million dollar drug
importation scheme.2 2 The Eleventh Circuit was not swayed. Generally, if the extrinsic act evidence is offered to prove intent, the required
degree of similarity is not as great.23 Because both offenses related to
trafficking in cocaine, the offenses were sufficiently similar that the
probative value of the extrinsic offense outweighed its prejudicial impact.
Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit held, the Beechum test was satisfied,
and the district court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted the
extrinsic act evidence.24
The temporal connection between the extrinsic act and the charged
offense is sometimes a factor in the determination of whether evidence
of the extrinsic act should be admitted. It is not, however, a very
significant factor. In United States v. Lampley," the Eleventh Circuit
held that transactions occurring fifteen years earlier were not too remote
in time to be inadmissible extrinsic act evidence."
In United States v. Muscatell" the Eleventh Circuit addressed the
28
issue of whether the evidence in question was extrinsic or intrinsic.
The outcome of this inquiry has significant ramifications. If the
evidence is extrinsic, it must pass muster under Rule 404(b), including
the Rule's notice requirement, and the jury must be instructed on the
proper use of extrinsic act evidence. If the evidence is intrinsic, it is
treated like any other evidence.
The fact that the evidence does not relate directly to the charged
offense does not necessarily mean that it is extrinsic. For example,
evidence is not extrinsic for the purposes of Rule 404 "if it arose out of
the same transaction or series of transactions as the charged offense,
was inextricably intertwined with evidence of the charged offense, or was
necessary to complete the story of the charged offense." 29 In Muscatell,
defendants contended that the evidence at issue was necessarily

22. Id.
23. The requisite degree of similarity depends on the purpose for which the extrinsic
act evidence is offered. If extrinsic act evidence is offered to establish identity, the
similarity between the extrinsic act and the charged offense "must be such that it marks
the offenses as the handiwork of the accused." United States v. Lail, 846 F.2d 1299, 1301
(11th Cir. 1988) (citing Beechum, 582 F.2d at 912 n.15).
24. United States v. Delgado, 56 F.3d at 1366.
25. 68 F.3d 1296 (11th Cir. 1995).
26. Id. at 1300.
27. 42 F.3d 627 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2617 (1995).
28. 42 F.3d at 630.
29. United States v. Collins, 779 F.2d 1520, 1532 (11th Cir. 1986); see also United
States v. Martin, 794 F.2d 1531, 1532-33 (11th Cir. 1986); United States v. Butler, 792 F.2d
1528, 1535 (11th Cir.), cert. denied sub nor., Waites v. United States, 479 U.S. 933 (1986).
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extrinsic and, thus, subject to Rule 404(b) scrutiny, because it occurred
either before or after the charged offenses.3 0 Defendants were charged
with conspiracy, fraud, and money laundering in connection with the
sale of condominiums, and the alleged extrinsic act evidence concerned
similar but unrelated land fraud schemes.31 The Eleventh Circuit
concluded that this evidence was not extrinsic. 2 The Court noted,
defendants "were charged with conducting a continuing scheme to
defraud, characterized by land flip transactions, inflated appraisals,
buyer rebates, and fraudulent loan applications."3 In reasoning that
was somewhat difficult to follow, the Eleventh Circuit noted that it was
necessary for the government to prove that defendants intentionally
devised a scheme to defraud.3' '[Qther transactions connected with
the offenses charged have long been used to show a general pattern, the
necessary criminal intent, or the guilty knowledge of the defendant."35
Therefore, the court held the evidence was intrinsic.36 It is not clear
how the fact that the evidence was probative of pattern, intent, or
knowledge can necessarily lead to a conclusion that the evidence is
intrinsic. On the contrary, these are issues that extrinsic act evidence
is often used to prove.
Apparently, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that the allegedly extrinsic
act evidence was actually an uncharged offense arising out of the same
transaction or series of transactions as the charged offense." If so, it
would seem that the Eleventh Circuit took an exceptionally broad view
of the charges against defendants.38
In 1991, the Supreme Court amended Rule 404(b) to provide that the
prosecution must, upon request by a defendant, give reasonable notice
in advance of trial of its intention to introduce extrinsic act evidence.39
In United States v. Lampley,4 defendant contended that the government failed to give this required notice because the differences between
the description of the evidence in the notice and the actual testimony
presented at trial "were so great that the notice was essentially
30. 42 F.3d at 630.
31. Id. at 631.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. (citing United States v. Dula, 989 F.2d 772, 777 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S.
Ct. 172 (1993)).
35. Id. (quoting Dula, 989 F.2d at 777).
36. Id.
37. This was the situation in Dula, upon which the court relied. 989 F.2d at 772.
38. See United States v. Cancelliere, 69 F.3d 1116, 1124 (11th Cir. 1995), for what
would appear to be a more conventional example of extrinsic/intrinsic analysis.
39. FED. R. Evil. 404(b).
40. 68 F.3d 1296 (11th Cir. 1995).
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ineffective."'" The Eleventh Circuit disagreed, holding that the
government need only provide notice of the general nature of the
extrinsic act evidence.42 Differences in the details do not render the
notice ineffective.
Rule 410 provides, inter alia, that statements made in the course of
plea discussions between a criminal defendant and a prosecutor are
inadmissible against the defendant.4
In United States v. Mezzanatto," the Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether Rule 410's
bar against the admission of plea discussions may be waived by a defendant.4 5 In Mezzanatto, defendant, in a standard agreement to enter
plea negotiations, agreed that any statements made by him during the
course of the plea discussions could be used to impeach his testimony if
negotiations were unsuccessful and the case proceeded to trial."
Eventually, the government terminated negotiations because the
prosecutor concluded that defendant was not providing completely
truthful information.47 At trial, the prosecutor cross-examined defendant about statements made during plea discussions that were
inconsistent with his trial testimony." When defendant denied these
statements, the government called an agent present at the meeting who
testified to his recollection of defendant's prior statements. 49 Defendant
was found guilty, but the Ninth Circuit reversed his conviction. 0 The
Ninth Circuit reasoned that Rule 410 did not expressly permit a
defendant to waive that rule's prohibition against the admission of
statements made during plea discussions, and thus Congress must not
have intended to allow such a waiver."
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a defendant could
knowingly and voluntarily waive Rule 410.2 The Supreme Court
rejected the Ninth Circuit's reasoning, noting that it is generally
accepted that legal rights, including those granted by evidentiary rules,

41. Id. at 1300 n.4.
42. Id.
43. FED. R. EVID. 410(4).
44. 115 S. Ct. 797 (1995).
45. Id. at 800.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 800-01.
50. 998 F.2d 1452, 1456 (9th Cir. 1993), cert.granted, 114 S. Ct. 1536 (1994), rev'd, 115
S. Ct. 797 (1995).
51. 998 F.2d at 1454.
52. 115 S. Ct. at 803, 806.
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can be waived by parties." Further, the Court concluded that a
blanket prohibition against waiver would be inappropriate." 4 Rather,
the Court reasoned, each case should be judged on its facts to determine
whether the waiver was made knowingly or voluntarily, or whether it
was the product of fraud or coercion.'
Justice Souter, in a beautifully written dissenting opinion joined by
Justice Stevens, acknowledged that, at first glance, Rule 410 seemed no
different than any other rule of evidence that can be waived." For
example, Justice Souter noted, Rule 802, regarding hearsay, and Rule
1002, regarding best evidence, may be waived.57 Looking more closely,
however, Justice Souter found a purpose behind Rule 410 broader than
merely providing evidentiary rules for parties.5" Rule 410 is intended
to promote the "'disposition of criminal cases by compromise.'"5 9 Absent
negotiated resolution of criminal cases, Justice Souter lamented, the
federal judicial system would grind to a halt.'
The provisions protecting a defendant against use of statements made
in his plea bargaining are thus meant to create something more than
a personal right shielding an individual from his imprudence. Rather,
the rules are meant to serve the interests of the federal judicial system
(whose resources are controlled by Congress), by creating the conditions
understood by Congress to be effective in promoting reasonable plea
agreements. 6'
Whether Congress was right or wrong in this judgment is immaterial.
Justice Souter's point was that Congress made the judgment and the
Court should respect it. The eventual effect of the majority's holding
was clear to Justice Souter. Defendants are typically in no position to
negotiate the framework of plea discussions. If Rule 410 can be waived
with regard to the admission of plea discussions to impeach a defendant,
then there is nothing to prevent the government from insisting, as a
precondition to plea negotiations, that statements made during plea
discussions could be used in the government's case in chief. Thus, any
defendant entering into plea discussions with the government will be
handing the government admissible evidence against him.

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Id. at 803.
Id. at 801 n.2.
Id. at 806.
Id. at 806 (Souter, J., dissenting).
Id. at 807.
Id.
Id. (citing FED. R. EVID. 410 advisory committee's note).
Id.
Id. at 808.
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The only defendant who will not damage himself by even the most
restrained candor will be the one so desperate that he might as well
walk into court and enter a naked guilty plea. It defies reason [Justice
Souter concluded] to think that Congress [desired] ... such a result
when it adopted a Rule [intended]... to promote candid discussion in
the interests of encouraging compromise.62
III.

ARTICLE VIII: HEARSAY

For the first time since the author has been surveying Eleventh
Circuit evidence decisions, the court rendered no significant decision
addressing the inherent conflict between the admission of hearsay
evidence and the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment.
However, this conflict lingers on the edges of every criminal case in
which evidence from an unavailable declarant is admitted, and criminal
law practitioners should keep abreast of the Eleventh Circuit's treatment
of this issue. These decisions are chronicled in past survey articles.
Rule 801(d)(1)(B) provides that a statement is not hearsay if it is
"consistent with the declarant's testimony and is offered to rebut an
express or implied charge against the declarant of recent fabrication or
improper influence on motive." 8
The Eleventh Circuit has long
recognized that a prior consistent statement may be admitted pursuant
to Rule 801(d)(1)(B) even though the prior statement was made after the
declarant developed a motive to fabricate." However, the circuits were
split on this issue, and in Tome v. United States," the Supreme Court
granted certiorari to the Tenth Circuit and held that a prior consistent
statement is not admissible to rebut a charge of recent fabrication unless
the statement was made before the alleged fabrication was made.66
In Tome, the government alleged that defendant abused his daughter
while the child was in his custody, but the abuse was only discovered
when the child visited her mother."7 Defendant argued that the
allegations were fabricated to prevent the child from returning to
him." The child testified at trial that defendant molested her. 9 The
government then produced six witnesses who testified to statements

62. Id. at 809-10.
63. FED. R. EvED. 801(dXl)(B).
64. See, e.g., United States v. Anderson, 782 F.2d 908, 915-16 (11th Cir. 1986).
65. 115 S. Ct. 696 (1995).

66.
67.
68.
69.

Id. at 700.
Id. at 699.
Id.
Id.
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made by the child concerning the alleged sexual abuse.7" All these
statements were made after the alleged motive to fabricate the charges
of sexual abuse arose.71 Defendant was convicted and the Tenth
Circuit affirmed his conviction.72
In reversing, a four-Justice plurality relied primarily on the "prevailing common law rule" that the prior consistent statement must be
"'made before the source of the bias, interest, influence, or incapacity
originated.' 73 Upon a careful review of the common law, the precise
wording of Rule 801(d)(1)(B), and Advisory Committee Notes, the
majority concluded that Congress intended to maintain the common law
pre-motive requirement. 4
Justice Scalia concurred in the judgment, but wrote separately to voice
his disagreement with the plurality's reliance on Advisory Committee
Notes. 75 Acknowledging that he had placed significant weight on these
notes in previous decisions, Justice Scalia found6 that "[more mature
consideration has persuaded me that is wrong."
Four dissenting Justices argued that the issue was not whether the
statement was hearsay, but whether it was relevant. 77 Even postmotive statements may be relevant to refute a charge of fabrication
depending upon the circumstances of a particular case.78 To the
dissenters, the admissibility of a post-motive prior consistent statement
should be judged under Rule 401 (whether the statement renders the
charge of recent fabrication less probable) and Rule 403 (whether the
probative value of the statement is substantially outweighed by its
prejudice). 79 Thus, the dissenters argued, the admissibility of a postmotive prior consistent statement must be determined by the facts 'of
each case.8°
Rule 801(d)(1)(C) provides that a witness's out-of-court identification
of a person is not hearsay if the declarant testifies at the hearing and is
subject to cross-examination.8 ' In 'United 'States v. Blackman,8" a
70. Id.

71. Id. at 700.
72. United States v. Tome, 3 F.3d 342 (10th Cir. 1993).
73. 115 S. Ct.'at 700 (quoting E. CLEARY, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 49, at 105 (2d
ed. 1972)).
74. Id. at 702.
75. Id. at 706 (Scalia, J., concurring).
76. Id.
77. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
78. ld. at 708.
79. Id. at 709.
80. Id.
81.
82.

FED. R. EvID. 801(dX1XC).
66 F.3d 1572 (11th Cir. 1995).
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government agent testified that an eyewitness to the robbery, allegedly
committed by defendant, identified defendant from a photo spread
Although the eyewitness was unable to
shortly after the robbery.'
identify defendant at trial, the Eleventh Circuit held that the agent's
testimony about the witness's identification of defendant shortly after
the robbery was admissible pursuant to Rule 801(dXl)(C).'
Rule 801(d)(2XE) provides that out-of-court statements by co-conspirators are not hearsay if they were made "during the course and in
furtherance of the conspiracy."' Decisions interpreting Rule 801(d)(2)(E) perhaps provide some insight as to why evidentiary issues figure less
and less prominently in criminal appeals. When the author began this
annual survey of Eleventh Circuit evidence decisions ten years ago, the
Eleventh Circuit applied the so-called James test to determine the
admissibility of co-conspirators' statements. In United States v.
James,' the old Fifth Circuit held that co-conspirators' statements
were not admissible unless the government showed by evidence other
than the statement itself that a conspiracy existed, that the declarant
and defendant were members of the conspiracy, and that the coconspirators made the statements in furtherance of the conspiracy 7
However, the Supreme Court, in Bourjaily v. United States," overruled
James to the extent that it prohibited district courts, in making
preliminary factual determinations concerning the existence of a
conspiracy, from relying on the co-conspirators' statements that the
government sought to admit.' In other words, the Supreme Court held
that the co-conspirator's statement itself could prove the existence of the
conspiracy and, thus, the government did not have to offer independent
evidence proving the conspiracy's existence before co-conspirators'
statements could be admitted. After Bourjaily, the number of appeals
in which Rule 801(d)(2)(E) figured prominently dramatically decreased.
It seems clear that Bourjaily'srelaxation of the criteria for the admission
of co-conspirators' statements is a reason for this.'
During the present survey, only one decision applying Rule 801(d)(2)(E) merits discussion, and it broke no new ground. In United States

83. Id. at 1578 n.6.
84. Id. at 1578.
85. FED. R. EvwD. 801(dX2)(E).
86. 590 F.2d 575 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 917 (1979).
87. 590 F.2d at 578.
88. 483 U.S. 171 (1987).
89. Id. at 175.
90. For discussion of the "liberal standard" applied by the Eleventh Circuit in
determining the admissibility of co-conspirators' statements, see United States v.
Bazemore, 41 F.3d 1431, 1434-35 (11th Cir. 1994).
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v. Lampley,9' defendant contended that a co-conspirator's statement
was not admissible against him because he did not join the conspiracy
until after the statements were made.92 The Eleventh Circuit, citing
United States v. Tombrello,93 held that a statement by a co-conspirator
is admissible against members of the conspiracy even though those
members joined the conspiracy after the statement was made. 94
In United States v. Walker,' defendant attempted to testify that
someone identified only as "Jeffrey" told defendant that he was involved
in the offense for which defendant was charged." Defendant argued
that he was only purchasing drugs from Jeffrey rather than selling
drugs.' He contended that Jeffrey's statements were admissible under
Rule 804(b)(3), which permits the admission of statements against a
declarant's penal interest.9" The district court excluded this evidence,
and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed.9 The Eleventh Circuit held that
defendant failed completely to prove the elements necessary for the
admission of statements against penal interest. 1°' First, Rule 804(b)(3)
requires that the declarant be unavailable, and defendant did not offer
evidence to this effect."° ' Second, defendant failed to adduce any
evidence corroborating Jeffrey's statement0 2 Finally, the court noted
that defendant had a motive to fabricate Jeffrey's alleged statements."0 3 Although this is not an element found in Rule 804(b)(3), the
Eleventh Circuit has held that the motives of a witness testifying to an
out-of-court statement may be considered.1 °4
IV.

ARTICLE IX: AUTHENTICATION AND IDENTIFICATION

In United States v. Puentes,0 5 defendant contended that the government had not properly authenticated transcripts of tapes of wiretapped
conversations.'06 The tapes had been destroyed as a matter of routine

91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

68 F.3d 1296 (11th Cir. 1995).
Id. at 1300-01.
666 F.2d 485 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 994 (1982).
68 F.3d at 1301 (citing Tornbrello, 666 F.2d at 491).
59 F.3d 1196 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 547 (1995).
59 F.3d at 1198.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1198, 1199.
Id. at 1199.
Id.
Id.

Id.
See United States v. Hendrieth, 922 F.2d 748, 750 (11th Cir. 1991).
50 F.3d 1567 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 341 (1995).
50 F.3d at 1576.
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procedure, but the district court permitted a Spanish police officer to
read from the Spanish transcript of the taped conversations. " The
police officer testified that he heard the conversations, presumably from
the actual tapes, and that the conversations were accurately transcribed.l1 The fact that the actual tape recordings had been destroyed
did not bar the admission of the content of the transcripts because the
transcripts were adequately authenticated by police officers."°
Finally, the court reasoned, defendant had an opportunity to crossexamine the police officer and, therefore, the jury had available adequate
1 0 With
information to assess whether the transcripts were authentic."
regard to the fact that the police officer was not familiar with defendant's voice before the wiretapping, the court noted that Rule 901(b)(5)
specifically provides that voice identification may be "based upon hearing
the voice at any time under circumstances connecting it'with the alleged
Therefore, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district
speaker.""'
that the government properly authenticated the
court's conclusion
2
transcripts."
Addressing a similar situation, the Eleventh Circuit, in United States
v. Green,' held that the government need not establish that every
person playing a role in the preparation of a transcript of a tape
recording can vouch for the accuracy of the transcript.1 Also, as in
Puentes, the court held that the fact that the monitoring agents only
became familiar with defendants' voices after their conversations had
been recorded did not bar the admission of the recordings." 5

107,
108.
109.
110.
111.

Id.
Id. at 1577.
Id.
Id.
FED. R. EVID. 901(bX5) (emphasis added).

112. 50 F.3d at 1577.
113. 40 F.3d 1167 (11th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1809 (1995).
114. 40 F.3d at 1173 (citing United States v. Hogan, 986 F.2d 1364, 1375 (11th Cir.

1993)).
115. Id. (citing United States v. Biggins, 551 F.2d 64, 68 (5th Cir. 1977)).

